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Abstract 
 The paper revisits the long-standing question of the impact of trade openness on the 
inflation-output trade-off by accounting for the effects of product market competition on price 
flexibility. The study develops a New-Keynesian open-economy dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model with non-constant price elasticity of demand and Calvo price setting in which 
the frequency of price adjustment is endogenously determined. It demonstrates that trade 
openness has two opposing effects on the sensitivity of inflation to output fluctuations. On the 
one hand, it raises strategic complementarity in firms’ pricing decisions and the degree of real 
price rigidities, which makes inflation less responsive to changes in real marginal cost. On the 
other hand, it strengthens firms’ incentives to adjust their prices, thereby reducing the degree of 
nominal price rigidities and increasing the sensitivity of inflation to changes in marginal cost. 
The study explains the positive relationship between competition and the frequency of price 
adjustment observed in the data. It also provides new insights into the effects of global economic 
integration on the Phillips Curve. 
 JEL classification: F41; E31; E32 
 Keywords: Trade Openness; Inflation; Nominal Rigidities; Real Rigidities; Phillips 
Curve 
1 Introduction 
The substantial increase in global economic integration during recent decades initiated a heated 
debate on the impact of trade openness on inflation and the short-run inflation-output trade-off. 
As understanding this impact is of crucial importance for the optimal design and conduct of 
monetary policy, the topic has attracted significant interest not only among academics but also 
policy makers.
1
 One of the key determinants of the sensitivity of inflation to changes in 
domestic economic activity is the degree of nominal price rigidities, which depends on the 
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See speeches by Kohn (2006), Bean (2006), Bernanke (2007), Fukui (2007) and Trichet (2008). 
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frequency with which firms change their prices. Previous studies analysing the effects of trade 
integration on inflation with the use of structural macroeconomic models have assumed that the 
frequency of price adjustment is constant and have therefore ignored the fact that changes in the 
openness of the economy and the resulting changes in competition may affect firms’ pricing 
policies. This is an important omission as surveys of firms’ price-setting behaviour as well as 
empirical studies based on disaggregated price data provide strong evidence of a positive 
relationship between the level of competition and the frequency of price changes.
2
 This study 
fills this gap by examining, within a New-Keynesian open-economy model, the impact of trade 
openness and product market competition on price flexibility and their implications for inflation 
dynamics. 
 The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, the study provides new insights into the 
determinants of real and nominal price rigidities and, in particular, it explains the positive 
relationship between competition and the frequency of price adjustment observed in the data. 
Second, by accounting for the impact of competition on firms’ price-setting behaviour, it sheds 
new light on the effects of trade openness on the Phillips Curve and the inflation-output 
trade-off. 
 For the purpose of the analysis, the paper develops a New-Keynesian DSGE model which 
builds on the open-economy framework with staggered price setting developed by Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler (2002) and Galí and Monacelli (2005). In order to capture the effects of competition 
on firms’ pricing policies, the proposed model departs from two standard assumptions used in 
New-Keynesian open-economy general equilibrium models. First, in place of the usual 
Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator implying constant elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated goods, the model introduces an extension of the consumption aggregator suggested 
by Kimball (1995) to an open-economy environment with a variable number of traded goods. 
The consumption aggregator is characterised by non-constant price elasticity of demand, which 
generates strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting decisions in that a firm’s optimal 
price depends positively on the prices charged by its competitors. It also accounts for the 
negative impact of trade openness on firms’ steady-state mark-ups.3 Second, the frequency of 
price adjustment is endogenised. Firms set their prices as in Calvo (1983); however, the 
probability of a price change in a given period is not exogenous, as is usually assumed, but is 
subject to firms’ optimising decisions.4 
 In the framework developed, the level of competition is defined as the total number of 
varieties available to domestic consumers. Trade integration, associated with an increase in the 
number of imported varieties, leads to a higher level of competition faced by firms.
5
 The level of 
competition affects the steady-state price elasticity of demand and desired mark-ups, which in 
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Surveys of the literature on the link between competition and the frequency of price adjustment can be found in 
Carlton (1989), Asplund and Friberg (1998) and Álvarez et al. (2006). 
3
The negative effect of trade openness on mark-ups has been documented by Chen, Imbs and Scott (2009), Konings 
and Vandenbussche (2005), Beccarello (1996) and Katics and Petersen (1994). See also Tybout (2003) for further 
references. 
4
A similar approach has been used by Romer (1990), Devereux and Yetman (2002), Levin and Yun (2007), Kimura 
and Kurozumi (2010) and Senay and Sutherland (2014) to study other determinants of the frequency of price 
adjustment, while Devereux and Yetman (2010) have applied it to examine the determinants of exchange rate 
pass-through. 
5
Empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of traded varieties has been an important feature of 
recent global economic integration (Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Galstyan and Lane, 2008). 
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turn determine the degree of strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting decisions and 
firms’ incentives to adjust their prices. 
 The analysis demonstrates that trade openness has two opposing effects on firms’ optimal 
pricing and inflation. On the one hand, greater trade integration and competition increases 
strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting decisions and the degree of real price rigidities, 
which makes inflation less sensitive to changes in domestic economic conditions. On the other 
hand, stronger competitive pressure raises the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices and leads 
to more frequent price adjustment, reducing nominal price rigidities and making inflation more 
sensitive to shocks. The overall impact of these changes on the short-run trade-off between 
output and inflation depends on the initial level of competition and openness of the economy. 
This paper therefore helps explain the fact that empirical studies fail to find a robust relationship 
between trade openness and the inflation-output trade-off.
6
 
 In the presence of strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting decisions, domestic 
inflation depends on two factors: real marginal cost and the relative price of domestic and 
imported goods. The ratio of domestic to import prices influences the prices charged by domestic 
firms in addition to its impact through the marginal cost channel as it affects firms’ price 
elasticity of demand and their desired mark-ups. Trade openness affects the sensitivity of 
inflation to both the marginal cost and the relative international prices. An increase in trade 
integration and in the number of varieties available in the domestic market raises firms’ 
steady-state price elasticity of demand and lowers their desired mark-ups. It also increases the 
sensitivity of a firm’s profit-maximising price to the prices charged by its competitors. This has 
two implications for firms’ price setting decisions. First, in a more open economy it is costlier for 
firms adjusting their prices in a given period to deviate from the prices charged by firms not 
adjusting their prices. In consequence, following any changes in real marginal cost, they adjust 
prices by a lesser amount. This increase in real price rigidity results in inflation becoming less 
responsive to changes in domestic economic conditions and a flattening of the Phillips Curve. 
Second, as in a more open economy the opportunity cost of any given deviation of a firm’s price 
from the profit-maximising price increases, firms adjust their prices more frequently. This in turn 
increases the responsiveness of inflation to changes in marginal cost and makes the Phillips 
Curve steeper. The overall effect of trade openness on the relationship between real marginal 
cost and inflation and the slope of the Phillips Curve is therefore ambiguous. At the same time, 
trade integration has a positive impact on the sensitivity of inflation to the relative price of 
domestic and imported goods. As the number of imported varieties in the domestic economy 
increases, prices charged by foreign competitors become more important in determining the 
optimal price of domestic firms and, in consequence, domestic inflation becomes more sensitive 
to changes in relative international prices. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section discusses related 
literature and how this paper contributes to it. Section three sets out the baseline version of the 
model developed for the purpose of this analysis, in which the frequency of price adjustment is 
assumed to be exogenous. Section four discusses the calibration of the model parameters. 
Section five analyses the impact of competition on the degree of real price rigidities and the 
Phillips Curve. In section six, the baseline model is extended by endogenising the frequency of 
price adjustment. The impact of competition and other structural features of the economy on the 
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E.g. Temple (2002) finds little evidence for a correlation between openness and the inflation-output trade-off. 
Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose (2005) report a negative impact of trade openness on the relationship between 
output and inflation, while Bowdler (2009) demonstrates a positive effect. 
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optimal frequency of price adjustment is then analysed and the overall effect of trade openness 
on inflation is discussed. The final section concludes and suggests avenues for further research. 
2 Related Literature 
Since the seminal paper by Romer (1993), the question of the impact of trade openness on 
inflation and the inflation-output trade-off has received much attention in macroeconomic 
literature. The results of this research are far from conclusive.
7
 Empirical and theoretical studies 
identified a number of factors which affect the relationship between trade openness and the 
sensitivity of inflation to output fluctuations. They include goods- and labour-market structures 
(Daniels and VanHoose, 2006; Bowdler and Nunziata, 2010), political regime (Caporale and 
Caporale, 2008), exchange rate regime (Bowdler, 2009), trade costs (Cavelaars, 2009), capital 
mobility (Daniels and VanHoose, 2009), the importance of imported commodities in production 
(Pickering and Valle, 2012) and exchange rate pass-through (Daniels and VanHoose, 2013). This 
paper contributes to this research by accounting for the impact of trade openness and the 
resulting changes in product market competition on price flexibility within a micro-founded 
New-Keynesian open-economy DSGE model. It shows that as trade openness has opposing 
effects on the degree of real and nominal price rigidities, its impact on the inflation-output 
trade-off is theoretically ambiguous and it depends on the initial level of openness and 
competition in the economy. 
 In the New-Keynesian framework, the sensitivity of domestic inflation to changes in 
domestic economic activity depends on two factors: the elasticity of inflation with regard to real 
marginal cost and the sensitivity of real marginal cost to changes in the output gap. The elasticity 
of inflation with regard to real marginal cost in turn depends on the frequency of price 
adjustment, which reflects the degree of nominal price rigidity, and on the responsiveness of 
firms’ profit-maximising price to changes in real marginal cost, which is determined by the 
degree of real price rigidity. Previous studies examining the effects of trade openness on the 
inflation-output trade-off based on structural macroeconomic models with staggered price setting 
focus either on the impact of trade integration on the sensitivity of marginal cost to the output 
gap (e.g. Galí and Monacelli, 2005; Binyamini and Razin, 2008; Woodford, 2010; Pickering and 
Valle, 2012) or on its effects on the responsiveness of firms’ optimal price to changes in 
marginal cost and the associated real price rigidity (Sbordone, 2010; Guerrieri, Gust and 
López-Salido, 2010; Benigno and Faia, 2010). This study is the first to explore the influence of 
trade integration and the resulting changes in competition on the frequency with which firms 
change their prices.
8
 
 The first part of the paper examines the effects of trade openness and product market 
competition on the degree of real price rigidities. This relationship has previously been 
investigated by Sbordone (2010), Guerrieri, Gust and López-Salido (2010) and Benigno and Faia 
(2010). However, this paper is the first to analyse it within a general equilibrium framework. 
There are also other important differences. In both Sbordone (2010) and Guerrieri, Gust and 
López-Salido (2010) real rigidities are due to households’ preferences implying non-constant 
price elasticity of demand, as is the case in this paper. However, Sbordone’s analysis is based on 
a closed-economy rather than an open-economy model. Guerrieri, Gust and López-Salido do not 
allow for the impact of trade integration on firms’ steady-state mark-ups and market shares, 
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See Daniels, Mazumder and VanHoose (2015) and Badinger (2009) for recent surveys of the literature. 
8
Rogoff (2003) postulated that globalisation affects inflation through its impact on price flexibility; however, he did 
not formalise this argument in a structural macroeconomic model. 
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which this paper takes into account. Benigno and Faia (2010) consider a different source of real 
rigidity. In their analysis, variable desired mark-ups arise not on the demand side of the economy 
but from strategic pricing associated with oligopolistic competition. 
 The second part of the paper analyses the impact of trade openness and competition on 
the frequency of price adjustment. Despite the central role that nominal price rigidities play in 
macroeconomic theory, their determinants are not well understood. Existing studies investigating 
the determinants of the frequency of price adjustment focus on the role of trend inflation, the size 
of the price adjustment costs and the variance of shocks (Romer, 1990; Dotsey, King and 
Wolman, 1999; Kiley, 2000; Devereux and Yetman, 2002; Levin and Yun, 2007) and monetary 
policy preferences (Kimura and Kurozumi, 2010; Senay and Sutherland, 2014). At the same 
time, there is substantial empirical evidence that the frequency with which firms change their 
prices depends on the degree of competition. Recent surveys of firms’ pricing policies conducted 
in a number of countries indicate that companies operating in markets with higher competitive 
pressure adjust their prices more frequently (Druant et al., 2009; Vermeulen et al., 2007; Álvarez 
and Hernando, 2007; Hoeberichts and Stokman, 2010; Álvarez and Hernando, 2005; Fabiani et 
al., 2005; Aucremanne and Druant, 2005). In a study conducted by the Bank of England, UK 
firms named an increase in competition as the most important factor behind the rise in the 
frequency with which they changed their prices over the last decade (Greenslade and Parker, 
2008). The positive link between the degree of competition and the frequency of price 
adjustment has also been confirmed by empirical studies based on disaggregated price data 
(Cornille and Dossche, 2006; Álvarez et al., 2006; Lünnemann and Matha, 2005; Encaoua and 
Geroski, 1986; Geroski, 1992; Carlton, 1986). Álvarez, Burriel and Hernando (2010) find that 
the frequency of producer price changes increases with import penetration. Despite the 
considerable empirical evidence, the theoretical literature investigating the relationship between 
competition and the speed of price adjustment is scant and the mechanism underlying it remains 
unclear. 
 Industrial organisation studies which analyse the impact of competition on the degree of 
nominal price rigidities in an oligopolistic environment provide conflicting results concerning 
the direction of this relationship.
9
 The influence of competition on the frequency of price 
adjustment under the assumption of monopolistic competition, which prevails in macroeconomic 
models, has hardly been examined. Some insights into the effects of competition on nominal 
rigidities in a monopolistically competitive environment can be gained from analysing the link 
between the price elasticity of demand and the frequency of price adjustment. Martin (1993) 
conducted such an analysis within a simple static setting, while Dotsey, King and Wolman 
(1999) use a dynamic general equilibrium model with state-dependent pricing. However, while a 
change in the price elasticity of demand can be an important outcome of the entry of new firms 
into a market and the associated increase in competition, it is not the only consequence. Changes 
in the number of traded varieties also affect firms’ market shares, the degree of strategic 
complementarity in price-setting decisions and the variability of desired prices, all of which 
influence firms’ incentives to adjust their prices. In contrast to previous studies, this paper 
analyses the effects of competition on the frequency of price changes in a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model with real rigidities and a variable number of traded varieties which 
takes all these effects into account. 
3 Model 
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The analysis is based on a New-Keynesian open-economy DSGE model. The world economy 
consists of two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign. Each country is populated by 
utility-maximising households and profit-maximising firms, owned by households, which 
produce differentiated goods and sell them in monopolistically competitive markets. There are 
two types of firms – exporters, which sell their goods in both the domestic and foreign economy, 
and non-exporters, which operate only in the domestic market. Firms set their prices using 
pricing-to-market, as in Betts and Devereux (1996), and Calvo contracts, as in Calvo (1983). In 
the baseline version of the model it is assumed that the probability of price adjustment in a given 
period is exogenous. Households consume all varieties which are sold in the domestic market. 
Their consumption aggregator is characterised by non-constant price elasticity of demand, which 
gives rise to strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting decisions – a firm’s optimal 
relative price depends not only on its marginal cost but is also positively related to the prices 
charged by its competitors. In each country monetary policy is conducted by a central bank 
which sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule. Business cycles are driven by 
productivity, preference and monetary policy shocks. 
3.1 Firms 
In each country, there is a continuum of firms indexed by i∈ [0,1]. All firms operating in the 
Home economy produce differentiated final consumption goods and sell them in an environment 
of monopolistic competitition. They use a production technology with constant returns to scale in 
which domestic labour is the only factor of production: 
     
titti
LAY
,,
=       (1) 
where 
ti
Y
,
 is the output produced by firm i at time t and 
ti
L
,
 is the labour input used in the 
production of that good. At denotes the level of technology which follows an exogenous process: 
a
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 In the Home and in the Foreign economy, a fraction of firms, equal to N and N
*
 
respectively, sell their goods both in the domestic market and abroad, whereas the remaining 
firms sell their goods only in the domestic market. All firms set their prices in the currency of the 
country in which their goods are sold.
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 Non-exporting firms in the Home economy, located in the interval [N,1], set their prices 
to maximise their expected discounted profits subject to the demand function, the production 
technology and the Calvo contracts. When they receive a signal to update their prices at time t, 
they choose the price of their product in the domestic market, 
tiH
P
,,
, that maximises: 
     , , , , , ,
= 0
( )
k
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k
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where 
tiH
C
,,
 is the Home demand for the good produced by firm i at time t, 
ti
MC
,
 denotes the 
firm’s nominal marginal cost at time t, 
1, tt
Q  is the stochastic discount factor and α∈ (0,1) 
represents the fraction of firms that do not adjust their prices in a given period. 
 Exporting firms in the Home economy, located in the interval [0, N], also maximise their 
expected discounted profits subject to similar constraints. However, they set two different prices 
– one for the Home market, 
tiH
P
,,
, and one for the Foreign market, 

tiF
P
,,
, so that they maximise: 
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where 

tiF
C
,,
 denotes the Foreign demand for the good produced by firm i at time t; St is the 
nominal exchange rate at time t, defined as the price of one unit of Foreign currency in terms of 
Home currency. The price 
tiH
P
,,
 is expressed in the Home currency, whereas 

tiF
P
,,
 is expressed 
in the currency of the Foreign economy. 
 The assumption that exporters are engaging in international price discrimination is 
consistent with the findings from substantial empirical literature on pricing-to-market which 
shows that the same goods are priced with different mark-ups across importing markets (see 
Goldberg and Knetter, 1997, for an extensive review). 
3.2 Households 
Each country is populated by a continuum of identical, infinitely-lived households located in the 
interval [0,1]. A representative household has a utility function which is additively separable in 
consumption, Ct, and labour, Lt, and given by: 
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where β∈ (0,1) is the intertemporal discount factor, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption, 0  is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour 
supply, and t
u
e  represents a shock to the marginal utility of consumption such that 
u
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 Households maximise their expected discounted lifetime utility subject to a sequence of 
budget constraints: 
     
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where 
1t
D  is the nominal payoff in period t + 1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t, Wt 
denotes nominal wage and Tt is a lump-sum component of income including dividends from 
ownership of firms. It is assumed that in both countries, households have unrestricted access to a 
complete set of contingent claims, traded internationally. 
3.3 Demand aggregator 
Households in the Home economy consume all domestically produced differentiated goods and 
all Foreign varieties available in the domestic market. Their consumption aggregator, Ct, is 
implicitly defined by the condition: 
    
1 (1 )
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where )(
,,
t
tiX
C
C
f  is an increasing, strictly concave function and X = {H, F}. The consumption 
aggregator adopted in the analysis extends the aggregators suggested by Kimball (1995) and 
Sbordone (2010) to an open-economy environment with a variable number of traded varieties. 
 The parameter  0,1N  is the fraction of Foreign goods which are exported to the 
Home economy and it determines the degree of trade openness. The total number of varieties 
available for sale in the Home market is equal to )(1  N  and it is a measure of the level of 
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competition in the economy. 
 The functional form of )(
,,
t
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C
C
f  used in the analysis is given by: 
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where the parameters η and γ determine the shape of the demand function. 
 The demand aggregator defined in this way departs from the standard assumption of 
constant price-elasticity of demand and introduces strategic complementarity in firms’ 
price-setting decisions which generates variable desired mark-ups.
11
 It is shown in Appendix A.1 
that the demand function associated with the consumption aggregator adopted can be written as: 
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t
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 is firm i’s market share and 
t
P  is an aggregate, competition-based price index 
which is given by:
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Its derivation is shown in Appendix A.2. 
 In the framework adopted, the price elasticity of demand, 
tiX ,,
 , is not constant, as is 
usually assumed, but is a function of firm i’s relative price and its market share: 
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In consequence, firm i’s desired mark-up, 
tiX ,,
 , is also a function of the firm’s relative price:13 
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In an equilibrium with symmetric prices, firm i’s market share is a function of the number of 
varieties traded in the economy, given by: 
                                                     
11
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) show that allowing for non-constant price elasticity of demand in Calvo-style 
models is important for rendering these models consistent with price duration data. 
12
This competition-based aggregate price index differs from the utility-based price index, Pt, defined as the cost of a 
unit of the composite good, Ct, but is also a homogenous function of degree one. 
13
Surveys conducted among firms in the Euro Area and in the UK indicate that pricing strategies based on variable 
mark-ups are widespread (Fabiani et al., 2005; Greenslade and Parker, 2008). 
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As a result, the steady-state price elasticity of demand, θ, and mark-up, μ, are also determined by 
the number of varieties traded and the level of competition in the economy: 
     




1
)(11
1
1)(
1
=




N
    (13) 
     
])(11)[1(1
1
=
1




 N
   (14) 
 The positive relationship between the number of varieties sold in a market and the 
steady-state price elasticity of demand, which is incorporated into the model through the 
specification of households’ preferences, is in line with the theory developed by Lancaster 
(1979), according to which firms’ entry causes ‘crowding’ of the varieties space. As more firms 
sell their differentiated products in the market, varieties become more substitutable and their own 
price elasticity of demand increases. The existence of a positive link between the number of 
varieties and the price elasticity of demand has been empirically supported by Hummels and 
Lugovskyy (2008). 
 The number of traded varieties also affects the curvature of the demand function, denoted 
by , which is the steady-state value of the elasticity of the price elasticity of demand with 
respect to the relative price, also referred to as the superelasticity of demand, and is given by: 
     
1
1
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    (15) 
The functional form of the demand aggregator adopted in the analysis has the convenient 
property that in the special case of η = 0 it is equivalent to a standard CES Dixit-Stiglitz 
consumption aggregator. 
3.4 Monetary policy 
Following Taylor (1993), in each country there is a central bank which sets the nominal interest 
rate, it, according to a simple rule: 
     =
t t y t t
i x v

         (16) 
where 
t
  is the deviation of inflation from its target, 
t
x  is the domestic output gap, defined as 
the difference between actual and potential output, and vt is a monetary policy shock such that 
v
ttvt
vv  
1
= , where 0;1)
v
  and ).(0, 2
v
v
t
N    
 Determinacy of the model solution is ensured by choosing policy parameters 

  and 
y
  
such that the Taylor principle is satisfied. 
 The monetary policy rule in the Home and Foreign economy together with the optimality 
conditions of profit-maximising firms and utility-maximising households and the resource 
constraints in both countries determine the equilibrium in the world economy. 
4 Parametrisation 
The model is calibrated assuming that one period of time corresponds to one quarter. In the 
benchmark calibration of the model parameters, firms’ probability of not receiving a price 
adjustment signal in a given period, denoted by α, is set to 0.75. The discount factor β is assumed 
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to be equal to 0.995, which implies an annual steady-state real interest rate of 2 per cent. The 
parameters of the monetary policy rule corresponding to the weights that the central bank places 
on inflation and output stabilisation, given by 

  and 
x
 , are set to 1.5 and 0.5 respectively, as 
in Taylor (1993). The values of the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in 
consumption, σ, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,  , are set to 1.38 and 
1.83 respectively, in line with Smets and Wouters’ (2007) estimates. The parametrisation of the 
shock processes is also based on Smets and Wouters (2007). A complete set of the values of the 
model parameters adopted in this analysis is listed in Table 0 in Appendix A.6. 
 The parameters γ and η, which control the shape of the demand function, are calibrated 
based on the study by Dossche, Heylen and Poel (2010). The authors use scanner price data from 
a large Euro Area retailer to estimate the price elasticity and superelasticity of demand for a wide 
range of products. They provide empirical evidence that the price elasticity of demand rises with 
relative price, which supports the introduction of concave demand functions into macroeconomic 
models. The study shows that the degree of strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting 
decisions, determined by the curvature of the demand function, is quite small and that it is 
strongly positively correlated with the price elasticity of demand. Based on the findings of 
Dossche, Heylen and Poel (2010), two different parametrisations of the demand function are 
considered. The values of the parameters adopted in this analysis are η1 = −0.30 and γ1 = 0.62 in 
the baseline calibration and η2 = −0.28 and γ2 = 0.67 in an alternative calibration. 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the properties of the demand function for the two calibrations 
adopted throughout the analysis. Figure 1 shows how firms’ price elasticity of demand and 
profits alter with changes in the relative price and how they compare with those obtained for a 
CES demand function. The figure demonstrates that in the case of a concave demand function 
and the associated strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting decisions, a firm’s price 
elasticity of demand is an increasing function of its relative price. As a result, the firm’s profits 
are more sensitive to changes in relative prices than in the case of the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption 
aggregator with constant price elasticity of demand. 
 In the framework adopted, the price elasticity of demand varies not only with a firm’s 
relative price but also with the degree of competition in the economy. The relationships between 
the level of competition, measured by  ,1  N  the steady-state mark-up, μ, the corresponding 
steady-state price elasticity of demand, θ, and the superelasticity of demand, , are shown in 
Figure 2. The figure demonstrates a negative relationship between competition and firms’ 
desired mark-ups. As the number of foreign firms in the domestic market increases from 0 to 1, 
which corresponds to a 100 per cent increase in the number of all varieties traded in the 
economy, the steady-state mark-up declines from 36 to 3 per cent in the baseline calibration and 
from 31 to 8 per cent in the alternative calibration. 
5 Competition and real rigidities 
In the framework with non-constant price elasticity of demand and a variable number of traded 
varieties developed above, inflation in the sector of domestically produced goods, 
,H t
 , is 
determined according to the following Phillips Curve:
14
 
                                                     
14
The equation is derived in Appendix A.4. The derivations of domestic and imported price indices, both 
utility-based and competition-based, as well as domestic and foreign demand functions, which are necessary in order 
to derive the Phillips Curve equations for inflation in the domestic and imported goods sectors, are presented in 
Appendices A.1 – A.3. 
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where 
d

1
1
=


  is a structural parameter reflecting the degree of strategic complementarity 
in firms’ price-setting decisions, 


 N
N
1
=  is the share of imported goods in the consumption 
basket and 


 1
1
=d ; 
t
mcr  is the log deviation of the domestic real marginal cost from its 
steady state at time t;
,H t
p  and 
,F t
p  denote the log deviations of the domestic and imported 
price indices, derived in Appendix A.3, from their respective steady states at time t. 
 Equation (17) shows that in the presence of strategic complementarity in firms’ 
price-setting decisions, domestic inflation depends not only on marginal cost but also on the 
relative price of domestic to imported goods. This is due to the fact that changes in the ratio of 
domestic to import prices affect the price elasticity of demand and firms’ desired mark-ups. To 
give an example, following a decrease in the price of imports which leads to an increase in the 
relative price of domestic goods, domestic producers face higher price elasticity of demand 
which prompts them to lower their mark-ups. As a result, domestic prices decline even if 
marginal cost remains unchanged. 
 Furthermore, the coefficients of the Phillips Curve depend on the number of varieties 
traded and the level of competition in the economy. The level of competition determines firms’ 
price elasticity of demand and the sensitivity of their optimal price to the prices charged by their 
competitors and affects both the sensitivity of domestic inflation to changes in real marginal cost 
and relative international prices. Firstly, an increase in competitive pressure in the Home 
economy, corresponding to an increase in  N1 , leads to a decrease in λ and therefore also a 
decline in the elasticity of inflation with respect to domestic marginal cost and an increase in the 
degree of real rigidities in price setting. Secondly, an increase in the number of imported 
varieties in the domestic market, resulting in higher ϖ, raises the sensitivity of domestic inflation 
to changes in the ratio of domestic to import prices.
15
 
 Figure 3 shows the relationship between the level of competition and the coefficients of 
the Phillips Curve. For the two calibrations of the model adopted in the analysis, an increase in 
the number of traded varieties by 100 per cent leads to a decrease in the elasticity of inflation 
with respect to real marginal cost by 26 and 27 per cent. At the same time, the coefficient on 
relative international prices rises from 0 to about 0.02. 
 The considerable increase in the sensitivity of domestic inflation to changes in the 
relative price of domestic to imported goods may suggest that an increase in the openness of the 
economy and competition leads to a dramatic increase in the importance of foreign economic 
developments in the determination of domestic inflation. However, it should be noted that this 
effect is partly counterbalanced by the fact that an increase in competition and the resulting 
                                                     
15
Guerrieri, Gust and López-Salido (2010) also find that in the presence of strategic complementarity domestic 
inflation depends on the relative price of domestic and imported goods. However, as their analysis does not take into 
account the impact of trade integration and competition on steady-state mark-ups, the elasticity of inflation with 
regard to marginal cost is independent of the level of competition. In contrast, Sbordone (2010) accounts for the 
impact of competition on the sensitivity of inflation to marginal cost but ignores the role of international relative 
prices in the determination of domestic inflation. 
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increase in the degree of strategic complementarity among firms raises the impact of the prices 
of domestic goods on the prices of goods which are imported. This is evident from the equation 
for imported goods inflation, 
Ft
 , given by:
16
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where 
d

1
1
=


 , 


 1
1
=d  and 



N1
1
=)(1   is the share of domestically produced 
goods in the consumption basket; 
t
m cr
  is the log deviation of the real marginal cost of the 
Foreign firms from its steady state at time t; 
t
z , given by 
, ,
=
t H t F t t
z p p s

  , denotes the 
deviation from the law of one price at time t – the discrepancy between the prices of the imported 
goods charged in the Foreign and Home markets and expressed in the Home currency.
17
 
 The effects of changes in the openness of the economy on inflation dynamics are 
illustrated by examining the impact of a positive one-standard-deviation productivity shock in 
the Home economy on inflation and its components in both the Home and Foreign economies, 
which is shown in Figure 4.
18
 The figure compares the responses of inflation to the shock in 
models with constant and non-constant price elasticity of demand.
19
 As would be expected, in 
the more open economy, the responses of Home price indices to a Home shock are relatively 
weaker and the responses of Foreign variables to such a shock are relatively stronger than in the 
less open economy. However, the effects of changes in openness on inflation are more 
pronounced in the presence of non-constant price elasticity of demand and strategic 
complementarity in firms’ price-setting behaviour due to the additional competitive effects of 
trade integration discussed above. 
6 Endogenous frequency of price adjustment 
In the analysis, it has so far been assumed that the fraction of firms which adjust their prices in 
each period, given by (1−α), is exogenously determined and does not depend on the level of 
competition in the economy. However, surveys of firms’ price-setting behaviour as well as 
empirical studies based on micro price data strongly suggest that the intensity of competitive 
pressures faced by firms affects the frequency with which they change their prices. In order to 
take this effect into account, in what follows the frequency of price adjustment is endogenised. It 
is still assumed that firms set their prices in a time-dependent manner; however, it is now posited 
that for a given set of structural features of the economy, including the level of competition, they 
are able to choose the frequency of price adjustment optimally. 
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For derivation see Appendix A.4. 
17
H t
p

 is the log deviation of the price of the Foreign good in the Foreign market expressed in the Foreign currency 
from its steady state, 
Ft
p  denotes the log deviation of the price of the Foreign good in the Home market expressed 
in the Home currency from its steady state and 
t
s  is the log deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its steady 
state level. 
18
Two levels of openness are considered, one in which foreign goods constitute 20 per cent of all goods sold in the 
domestic economy and one in which the share of foreign goods in the consumption basket is equal to 43 per cent, 
which correspond to N = 0.25 and N = 0.75 respectively. The difference in trade openness in these two 
parametrisations is similar to the increase in openness in Germany between 1993 and 2012. 
19
In the model with constant price elasticity of demand, firms' steady-state desired mark-ups are set to 19 per cent, 
which corresponds to the desired mark-ups obtained for N
∗  = 0.5 in the non-constant price elasticity model. 
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 As in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), the assumption that firms use time-dependent 
rather than state-dependent pricing policies is motivated by the presence of re-optimization costs 
such as the costs associated with information-gathering, decision-making, negotiation and 
communication, which do not make it optimal for firms to review their prices in each period. 
Using microeconomic data, Zbaracki et al. (2004) show that these costs are substantially more 
important than menu costs.
20
 
6.1 Firms’ price setting decisions 
In this framework, firms’ pricing decisions can be thought of as being taken in two stages. In the 
first stage, firms decide on their pricing policy – they choose a frequency of price adjustment 
which, for a given structure of the economy and a given cost of price adjustment, maximises the 
expected discounted value of their lifetime profits. In the second stage, firms set their prices 
optimally in line with their chosen pricing policy. In other words, once the frequency of price 
adjustment has been chosen, firms take it as given in subsequent periods and adjust their prices 
accordingly as long as the structure of the economy remains unchanged. 
 Following Rotemberg (1982) and Romer (1990), firm i’s problem of profit maximisation 
associated with its choice of the frequency of price adjustment is equivalent to the problem of 
minimisation of the unconditional expected value of the following loss function:
21
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with respect to αi, where αi is the probability that firm i keeps its price unchanged in a given 
period; α is the fraction of all firms which do not adjust their prices in a given period; G is the 
cost of price adjustment; 
t
f
ti
P
P
,
 is the optimal relative price in period t if prices were adjusted 
without cost in each period; 
t
o
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P
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,
 is the optimal relative price in period t in the presence of 
nominal rigidities and price adjustment costs. )(
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The assumption of time-dependent price setting policies is also consistent with survey evidence. Firms' surveys 
indicate that in the Euro Area 34 per cent of firms use purely time-dependent pricing policies, whereas about 46 per 
cent of them use a combination of time- and state-dependent strategies (Fabiani et al., 2005). In the US the fraction 
of firms reviewing their prices on a periodic basis is even higher and equals 40 per cent (Blinder et al., 1998). 
21
For tractability, it is assumed that firms choose the frequency with which they change their prices in the domestic 
market optimally and that exporters adopt the same frequency of price adjustment for exports. In consequence, the 
frequency of price adjustment of all goods sold in the economy, whether they are domestically produced or 
imported, is the same. 
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 The loss function represents the difference in the expected present value of firm i’s 
profits in the case in which it adjusts its price in a given period with probability  
i
1  and 
incurs a fixed cost of price adjustment and the case in which it adjusts its price in each period 
without any costs. The first term on the right hand side of the equation reflects the cost of setting 
a new price in period t, the second term denotes a loss in profit resulting from keeping this price 
unchanged in subsequent periods, whereas the last term represents the sum of losses in profit 
from setting a new price in some future period and keeping it unchanged thereafter. 
 Using the law of iterated expectations,    ),(=),(
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unconditional expected value of the loss function (19), given by  ),(=),(
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Minimisation of (20) with respect to αi gives rise to the following first order condition, which in 
equilibrium must hold for all firms: 
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When choosing their frequency of price adjustment  
i
1 , firms take as given the frequency of 
price adjustment of other firms. The condition for the economy-wide frequency of price 
adjustment (1−α) to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium is that the optimality condition (21) holds 
at αi equal to α for all firms. Therefore, the frequency of price adjustment (1−αi) which satisfies 
(21) with αi = α for all firms is the optimal frequency of price adjustment. 
6.2 Forces driving the optimal frequency of price adjustment 
The first order condition (21) shows that the optimal frequency of price adjustment equalises the 
cost of price adjustment with the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices. This opportunity cost 
depends on the expected discounted sum of the differences between profits obtained at the 
optimal flexible price and the actual price in a given period. The greater the differences, the 
greater incentive firms have to adjust their prices. In order to understand the determinants of the 
frequency of price adjustment, it is therefore crucial to identify the factors determining the 
difference between profits obtained at a price which would be optimal for a given period if firms 
were able to adjust their prices in each period without cost and profits obtained at the prevailing 
price in that period. This difference will henceforth be referred to as the ‘period loss function’. 
 After a second-order approximation of firm i’s profits, 
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 The approximation (22) reveals that the loss in profits in a given period depends on two 
factors: the deviation of the optimal relative price from the actual price in that period, 
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 , which determines the 
opportunity cost of a given deviation of the actual price from the optimal flexible price. 
The period loss function can be further approximated and rewritten as a function of the 
steady-state values of the model variables and the log deviations of the optimal flexible price and 
the actual price from their steady states:
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 The profit loss associated with a given deviation of the actual price from the optimal 
price depends on the sensitivity of demand to changes in a firm’s relative price, which is 
determined by the price elasticity of demand and the superelasticity of demand. It also depends 
on the steady-state demand for the firm’s product, which is determined by the firm’s steady-state 
market share and the steady-state level of output. The deviation of the optimal relative price from 
the actual price depends on a number of structural features of the economy, including the degree 
of strategic complementarity in firms’ price setting decisions, the importance of the relative price 
of imported to domestic goods in the determination of domestic inflation and the frequency with 
which firms change their prices. 
6.3 Competition and nominal rigidities 
Having identified the factors determining the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices, it is now 
possible to analyse how they are affected by the level of competition in the economy. Firstly, the 
level of competition affects firms’ steady-state revenues and profits. There are two forces acting 
in opposite directions. On one hand, an increase in the number of competitors lowers firms’ 
steady-state market shares, 
Y
Y
i , and mark-ups, 
1
=


 , which has a negative impact on firms’ 
profits and drives the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices down. On the other hand, however, 
an increase in competitive pressure reduces the distortion associated with imperfect competition 
and increases the steady-state level of output, Y, which raises firms’ profits and thereby 
strengthens their incentives to adjust prices. Secondly, a rise in competition increases the 
sensitivity of firms’ profits to a given deviation of the actual price from the desired price. Greater 
competition is associated with higher price elasticity of demand, θ, and higher superelasticity of 
demand, , which makes it costlier for firms to keep their prices unchanged. Furthermore, an 
increase in trade openness and competition increases strategic complementarity in firms’ 
price-setting decisions and the importance of the relative price of domestic to imported goods in 
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For derivation see Appendix A.5. 
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the determination of domestic inflation, which influence the deviations of firms’ prices from 
their desired prices, 
, ,
f o
i t k i t
p p

 , and thereby also the costs and benefits of price adjustment. 
Finally, the deviations of a firm’s price from its desired price are also affected by the frequency 
of price adjustment by other firms in the economy, which in turn depends on the level of 
openness and competition. 
 The analysis shows that competition affects several determinants of the opportunity cost 
of not adjusting prices and that there are divergent forces at work. The net effect of greater 
competition on the degree of nominal price rigidities can be determined numerically. 
 Combining (21) and (23), the equilibrium condition associated with the choice of a firm’s 
pricing policy can be written as follows: 
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 For a given level of competition, the equilibrium frequency of price adjustment can be 
obtained in the following way. Firstly, the model described in section two is solved for a given 
level of α. Secondly, the obtained solution is substituted into equation (24) and it is examined 
whether the condition holds with αi equal to α. The α for which this is the case determines the 
equilibrium frequency of price adjustment. This strategy can be used to find the optimal 
frequency of price adjustment for different levels of competition. 
 Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the relationship between the level of competition and the price 
adjustment frequency, (1 − α), for two different calibrations of the demand function. They show 
that competition generally has a positive impact on the optimal frequency of price changes. A 
100 per cent increase in the number of varieties available to domestic consumers, associated with 
a decline in mark-ups from 36 to 3 per cent in the baseline calibration and from 31 to 8 per cent 
in the alternative calibration, leads to an increase in the share of firms adjusting their prices in a 
given period from 35 per cent to 49 and 41 per cent respectively.
23
 
 The effects of greater competition are relatively small and ambiguous when the initial 
levels of the openness of the economy and competition are low and they are much larger for a 
higher initial degree of openness and competitive pressure. This is due to the fact that when a 
firm enjoys high market power and its steady-state mark-up is high, an increase in competition 
resulting in a decline in this mark-up by one percentage point is associated with relatively small 
increases in the steady-state price elasticity and superelasticity of demand. While these increases 
raise the profit loss resulting from a given deviation of the firm’s actual price from its optimal 
price, this effect is to some extent offset by a decrease in the average deviation of the actual price 
from the desired price induced by higher competition. In turn, when a firm’s steady-state 
mark-up is low, a decrease in this mark-up by one percentage point gives rise to a substantial 
increase in both price elasticity and superelasticity of demand and this increase has a strong and 
dominating effect on firms’ incentives to adjust their prices. 
 The analysis of the impact of trade openness and competition on the frequency with 
which firms change their prices demonstrates that greater competitive pressure reduces the 
degree of nominal price rigidities, which is consistent with empirical and survey evidence 
                                                     
23
When solving for the optimal frequency of price adjustment, the value of the price adjustment cost, G, is 
calibrated based on a study by Zbaracki et al. (2004), who estimate that these costs constitute 1.22 per cent of firms’ 
revenues. Setting these costs equal to about 4 per cent of firms’ revenues, an estimate obtained by Willis (2000), 
reduces the optimal price adjustment frequency by about 6-8 percentage points for any given level of competition as 
compared to the benchmark calibration. 
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concerning firms’ price-setting behaviour. 
6.4 Other determinants of the frequency of price adjustment 
 Competition is not the only factor affecting the optimal frequency of price adjustment. 
Any changes in the structural features of the economy which influence the variability of desired 
prices also affect the average deviation of the actual price from the optimal price and therefore 
the optimal price adjustment frequency. One such feature is the magnitude of shocks hitting the 
economy. 
 Figure 7 shows the optimal frequency of price adjustment for different values of the 
standard deviation of shocks. A 20 per cent decrease in the standard deviations of all 
macroeconomic shocks reduces the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices and leads to a 
decrease in the fraction of firms updating their prices in a given period by about 3 percentage 
points for any given level of competition.
24
 
 For a similar reason, the optimal frequency of price adjustment also depends on the 
parameters of the monetary policy rule. The greater weight the central bank places on inflation 
stabilisation, the less variable is the desired price and the less frequent the price adjustment.
25
 
An increase in ϕπ from 1.5 to 2.0 reduces the fraction of firms adjusting their prices in a given 
period by 5-7 percentage points, which is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 The analysis sheds new light on the results from previous studies, discussed in section 2, 
which identified a number of factors influencing the short-run inflation-output trade-off and its 
relationship with trade openness. By affecting the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices, any 
factors which influence the level and volatility of inflation and hence also the variability of 
desired prices, such as central bank independence, exchange rate pass-through and the exchange 
rate regime, may lead to changes in the optimal frequency of price adjustment and the sensitivity 
of inflation to fluctuations in domestic economic activity. 
6.5 Competition and the Phillips Curve 
The study has demonstrated that greater trade openness and competition leads to a higher degree 
of real price rigidities and a lower degree of nominal price rigidities in the economy. The overall 
impact of openness on the parameters of the Phillips Curve is shown in Figure 9. An increase in 
trade openness and competitive pressures faced by firms unambiguously leads to an increase in 
the elasticity of inflation with respect to the relative price of domestic and imported goods and 
this effect is particularly strong for highly integrated economies. The influence of greater 
competition on price flexibility and the sensitivity of domestic inflation to changes in domestic 
marginal cost depends on the initial level of openness and competitive pressure in the economy. 
For a relatively closed economy in which firms have high market power the effect is small and 
negative. For a high initial level of openness and competition, an increase in the frequency of 
price adjustment associated with trade integration more than offsets the increase in the degree of 
real price rigidities and, as a result, price flexibility and the elasticity of inflation with respect to 
marginal cost rise. For the two calibrations of the model parameters adopted in the analysis, 
greater competition results in greater sensitivity of inflation to changes in real marginal cost 
when steady-state mark-ups are below 22-23 per cent. 
 By accounting for the effects of competition on price rigidities, the study provides yet 
                                                     
24
A similar result has been obtained by Romer (1990) who also finds a positive relationship between the frequency 
of price changes and the variance of shocks. 
25
This result confirms findings by Kimura and Kurozumi (2010) and Senay and Sutherland (2014) obtained in 
closed-economy models. They also show that the frequency of price adjustment is negatively related to the weight 
that the central bank places on inflation stabilisation. 
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another channel through which the impact of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips curve is 
theoretically ambiguous and which helps to explain the conflicting results concerning the 
direction of this relationship obtained in the empirical literature. Furthermore, the finding that the 
effects of trade openness on the inflation-output trade-off depend on the initial level of openness 
and competition is consistent with the general pattern in the empirical results obtained for 
different sets of countries over different time periods. As noted in Daniels, Mazumder and 
VanHoose (2015), earlier studies on this topic based on data up to the late 1980s tend to find no 
or negative impact of increased openness on the sensitivity of inflation to changes in domestic 
economic activity (Temple, 2002; Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose, 2005). In contrast, studies 
examining more recent data consistently find evidence of a positive, statistically significant 
effect of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips Curve (Bowdler, 2009; Pickering and Valle, 
2012; Daniels and VanHoose, 2013; Daniels, Mazumder and VanHoose, 2015). A comparison of 
the shares of imports in GDP, which is the standard measure of trade openness used in the 
literature, reveals that the average levels of openness in the cross-country data samples used by 
Bowdler (2009), Pickering and Valle (2012), Daniels and Van Hose (2013) and Daniels, 
Mazumder and VanHoose (2015) are higher than the average levels of openness in the data 
analysed by Temple (2002) and Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose (2005), which may help to 
explain their different findings. 
 The results of this paper have several implications for future empirical work on the 
impact of trade openness on the sensitivity of inflation to output fluctuations. Firstly, as countries 
with different initial levels of openness may observe very different effects of trade integration on 
price stickiness and inflation, the study provides additional motivation for country-specific 
time-series analysis of this relationship along the lines of Eijffinger and Qian (2010) which does 
not impose the assumption of parameter constancy across countries. Secondly, the results suggest 
that both cross-country and country-specific studies should account for the initial level of 
competition and firms’ market power as one of the determinants of the impact of trade openness 
on the short-run trade-off between output and inflation. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper examined the impact of trade openness and product market competition on firms’ 
price-setting decisions and the inflation-output trade-off. It provided new insights into the 
determinants of real and nominal price rigidities. The analysis demonstrated that stronger 
competitive pressure, resulting from a higher number of varieties available in the domestic 
market, raises the sensitivity of firms’ profit-maximising price to the prices charged by their 
competitors and the degree of real price rigidities. The level of competition and the associated 
degree of strategic complementarity affect firms’ opportunity cost of not adjusting prices. There 
are two divergent forces at work. On one hand, greater competition and the resulting higher 
degree of real rigidities leads to a lower average deviation of firms’ optimal price from their 
actual price following a change in economic conditions, which reduces firms’ incentives to 
adjust their prices. On the other hand, higher steady-state price elasticity and superelasticity of 
demand associated with greater competition raises the loss of profit resulting from a given 
deviation of the desired price from the actual price, which makes it more profitable for firms to 
adjust their prices. For plausible calibration of the model parameters the latter effect dominates 
and, as a result, stronger competitive pressure leads to more frequent price adjustment and a 
lower degree of nominal rigidities in the economy. The study therefore provides a theoretical 
explanation of the positive link between competition and the frequency of price adjustment 
evident from empirical studies and surveys of firms’ price-setting behaviour. 
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 Accounting for the effects of competition on the degree of real and nominal price 
rigidities sheds new light on the impact of global economic integration on the Phillips Curve and 
inflation dynamics. In the presence of strategic complementarity in firms’ price-setting decisions, 
domestic inflation depends not only on domestic real marginal cost but also on the ratio of the 
prices of imported goods to the prices of domestically produced goods. The level of competition 
affects both the elasticity of inflation with regard to marginal cost and relative international 
prices. The stronger the competitive pressure, the greater the importance of the price ratio of 
imported to domestic goods in the determination of domestic inflation. Due to the fact that 
changes in competition lead to changes in real and nominal price rigidities in opposite directions, 
the overall impact of trade openness on the inflation-output trade-off and the slope of the Phillips 
Curve is ambiguous and depends on the initial level of openness and competition in the 
economy. For highly integrated economies the effect of trade integration on price flexibility is 
positive and therefore trade openness raises the sensitivity of inflation to changes in domestic 
economic activity, which is consistent with recent empirical evidence. 
 There are a number of ways in which the impact of trade openness and competition on 
price rigidities and its implications for the inflation-output trade-off could be explored further. 
Firstly, in line with extensive empirical evidence and in order to focus on the strategic 
interactions between firms selling their goods in a given market, this study assumes that firms set 
prices in the currency of the country in which goods are sold. It would be interesting to consider 
the effects of openness on price stickiness under alternative assumptions concerning price setting 
by exporters, including producer currency pricing and a combination of local currency pricing 
and producer currency pricing strategies. This would make it possible to analyse the impact of 
the degree of exchange rate pass-through on the relationship between trade openness and the 
inflation-output trade-off, which has been shown to play a role in the related literature. 
 Furthermore, one limitation of the analysis is that in the model developed the parameters 
of the monetary policy rule are assumed to be exogenous and independent of the parameters of 
the Phillips Curve. However, studies on optimal monetary policy have shown that the 
inflation-output trade-off affects the optimal monetary policy rule. In turn, as has been discussed 
in section 6.4, by affecting the variability of inflation, the parameters of the monetary policy rule 
affect the optimal frequency of price adjustment. It would therefore be valuable to analyse the 
effects of trade openness and competition on the inflation-output trade-off in a setting in which 
monetary policy parameters are endogenously determined and which takes the above feedback 
effects into account. 
 Finally, in order to isolate the effects of trade openness on the inflation-output trade-off 
resulting from changes in real and nominal price rigidities and provide a clear exposition of the 
underlying mechanism, the model has been kept relatively simple and does not incorporate many 
other channels which have been shown to affect this relationship. In future research it would be 
desirable to examine the impact of trade-openness on price flexibility alongside these other 
channels within a richer framework which would allow assessing their relative importance and 
providing a more comprehensive analysis of the net effect of trade openness on the slope of the 
Phillips Curve. 
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A Appendix 
A.1 Derivation of demand functions 
A.1.1 Demand for individual varieties as a fraction of aggregate consumption 
The consumption aggregator Ct is implicitly defined by equations (6) and (7). Therefore, 
households choose the levels of consumption of individual Home and Foreign varieties, 
tiH
C
,,
 
and 
tiF
C
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, in order to minimise their expenditure Dt given by: 
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subject to (6). 
The Lagrangian for the optimisation problem is: 
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We define the competition-based aggregate price index = .
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The demand function for an individual variety is therefore given by equation (8) 
A.1.2 Demand for individual domestic varieties as a fraction of the consumption of 
domestic goods 
The demand aggregator for the consumption of domestic goods, denoted by ,
,tH
C  is implicitly 
defined by: 
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Households choose the levels of consumption of individual domestic varieties, 
tiH
C
,,
, in order to 
minimise their expenditure: 
     
1
, , , , ,
0
=
H t H i t H i t
D P C di      (31) 
subject to (29). 
The Lagrangian for the optimisation problem is: 
    
1 1
, ,
, , , ,
,0 0
= 1
H i t
H i t H i t H
H t
C
L P C di f di
C
  
    
   
     (32) 
The first order condition with respect to 
tiH
C
,,
 is given by: 
     1
,
,,
,
,,
])[(1=


 

tH
tiH
tH
H
tiH
C
C
C
P    (33) 
We define the competition-based domestic price index 
,
,
= .
H
H t
H t
P
C

 After substitution: 
     
, , , , 1
, ,
= [(1 ) ]
H i t H i t
H t H t
P C
P C

 

      (34) 
The demand function for the domestic good as a fraction of the domestic consumption 
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aggregator is therefore given by: 
    
1
1
, , , ,
, ,
1
=
(1 ) (1 )
H i t H i t
H t H t
C P
C P
 
 
 
 
  
    (35) 
A.1.3 Demand for individual imported varieties as a fraction of the consumption of 
imported goods 
The demand aggregator for the consumption of imported goods, denoted by ,
,tF
C  is implicitly 
defined by: 
     
1
, ,
,1
( ) = 1
N
F i t
F t
C
f di
C


      (36) 
  




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


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
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


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1
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11
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1
=)(where
,
,,
,
,,




NC
C
C
C
f
tF
tiF
tF
tiF
 (37) 
Households choose the levels of consumption of individual imported varieties, 
tiF
C
,,
, in order to 
minimise their expenditure: 
     
1
, , , , ,
1
=
N
F t F i t F i t
D P C di


      (38) 
subject to (36). 
The Lagrangian for the optimisation problem is: 
    
1 1
, ,
, , , ,
,1 1
= ( ) 1
N N
F i t
F i t F i t F
F t
C
L P C di f di
C
 
  
   
 
 
    (39) 
The first order condition with respect to 
tiF
C
,,
 is given by: 
     1
,
,,
,
,,
])[(1=


 

tF
tiF
tF
F
tiF
C
C
C
P    (40) 
We define the competition-based imported price index 
,
,
= .
F
F t
F t
P
C

 After substitution: 
      
, , , , 1
, ,
= [(1 ) ]
F i t F i t
F t F t
P C
P C

 

     (41) 
The demand function for the imported good as a fraction of domestic consumption aggregator is: 
    
1
1
, , , ,
, ,
1
=
(1 ) (1 )
F i t F i t
F t F t
C P
C P
 
 
 
 
  
    (42) 
A.2 Derivation of competition-based price indices 
A.2.1 Aggregate competition-based price index 
After substituting the demand function (8) into (6) we obtain: 
    
1
1
, ,
0
1 1 1
1
(1 ) 1 (1 )
H i t
t
P
di
P N


   


 
             
  
   (43) 
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1
1
, ,
1
1 1 1
1 = 1
(1 ) 1 (1 )
N
F i t
t
P
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

   

 

 
              
  
  
The competition-based aggregate price index can then be expressed as (9). 
A.2.2 Domestic competition-based price index 
After substituting the demand function (35) into (29) we obtain: 
   
1 1
, ,
,0
1 1
1 = 1
(1 ) (1 )
H i t
H t
P
di
P


   

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  
   (44) 
The competition-based domestic price index can then be written as: 
     
1
1
1
, , ,
0
= ( )
H t H i t
P P di

 



 
 
  
     (45) 
A.2.3 Imported competition-based price index 
After substituting the demand function (42) into (36) we obtain: 
   
1 1
, ,
,1
1 1 1
1 = 1
(1 ) (1 )
N
F i t
F t
P
di
P N


   
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 
    
         
  
    (46) 
The competition-based imported price index can then be written as: 
    
1
1
1
, , ,
1
= ( )
N
F t F i t
P P di







 
 
 
 
  (47) 
A.3 Derivation of utility-based price indices 
A.3.1 Aggregate utility-based price index 
The aggregate utility-based consumption index, Pt, defined as the minimum expenditure 
necessary to obtain a unit level of aggregate consumption Ct, satisfies the following condition: 
    
1 1 1
, , , , , , , , , ,
0 1 0
= =
N N
t t H i t H i t F i t F i t i t i t
P C P C di P C di P C di
 
 
     (48) 
Substituting the demand function (8) into (48) we have: 
   
1
1
1
,
,
0
1 1
=
1 1
N
i t
t i t t
t t
P
P P C di
C P
 
 

 
 
  
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After using (9) we obtain: 
  
1
1 1 1
1
, , ,
0 0 0
1 1
= =
(1 ) (1 )
N N N
t t i t i t i t
P P P di P di P di



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 
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
 
    
    
       
 
    (50) 
A.3.2 Domestic utility-based price index 
The domestic utility-based consumption index, 
tH
P
,
, defined as the minimum expenditure 
necessary to obtain a unit level of domestic consumption 
tH
C
,
, satisfies the following condition: 
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1
, , , , , ,
0
=
H t H t H i t H i t
P C P C di      (51) 
Substituting the demand function (35) into (51) we have: 
    
1
1 1
, ,
, , , ,
, ,0
1 1
=
1 1
H i t
H t H i t H t
H t H t
P
P P C di
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 
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   (52) 
After using (45) we obtain: 
    
1
, , , ,
0
1
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(1 )
H t H t H i t
P P P di

 
 
  
     (53) 
A.3.3 Imported utility-based price index 
The imported utility-based consumption index, 
tF
P
,
, defined as the minimum expenditure 
necessary to obtain a unit level of imported consumption 
tF
C
,
, satisfies the following condition: 
     
1
, , , , , ,
1
=
N
F t F t F i t F i t
P C P C di


     (54) 
Substituting the demand function (42) into (54) we have: 
    
1
1 1
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, , , ,
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=
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After using (47) we obtain: 
    
1
, , , ,
1
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A.4 Derivation of the Phillips Curve equations 
A.4.1 Domestic price inflation 
In order to derive the Phillips Curve for domestic inflation, it is necessary to solve the 
optimisation problem of a domestic firm setting the price of its good in the domestic market, 
tiH
P
,,
. When receiving a signal to update its price, a domestic non-exporter chooses a price of its 
good in the domestic market to maximise (2) subject to (8), whereas a domestic exporter chooses 
a price of its good in the domestic market such that it maximises (3) subject to (8). 
 The first order condition with respect to 
tiH
P
,,
 is the same for both the exporter and the 
non-exporter and is given by: 
  0=][
,,
,,
,,,,,,,,,
0=
o
tiH
ktiH
ktiHktktiHktiHktiHktk
k
k
t
P
C
MCCCQE



    (57) 
The equation can be rewritten as: 
  0=])(1[
,,
,
1,
1,
,
,
,,
,
,,
,,,
0=
ktiH
tH
tH
tH
ktH
ktH
kt
ktiD
tH
o
tiH
ktiHktk
k
k
t
P
P
P
P
P
MC
P
P
CQE








   (58) 
We will now define the relative optimal domestic price 
tH
o
tiH
tiH
P
P
R
,
,,
,,
=  , real domestic marginal 
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cost 
ktH
kt
kt
P
MC
MCR



,
=  and domestic inflation .=
1,
,
,


tH
tH
tH
P
P
 After substitution, (58) can be 
expressed as: 
  
,= 0
, , , , , , , , ,
= 0 ,
[ (1 ) ] = 0
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H t sk s
t k t k H i t k H i t H i t k t k H i t k
k H t
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    
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 
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
  (59) 
Using the fact that t
u
kt
u
kt
t
t
ktk
ktk
e
P
P
C
C
Q





 








=
,
 and after log-linearizing (59) around a 
symmetric steady state we have: 
 
, , , , , ,
= 0 = 0
1
= (1 ) ( ) ( )
1
k
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H i t t t k H t s H t H i t k
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

  
   

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The log deviation of the price elasticity of demand from its steady state is given by: 
 
, , , , , , , ,
= 0
1
= ( ) ( )
1 1
k
H i t k H i t H t H t s H t F t
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N
r p p
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   
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 
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Therefore, after substitution, (60) can be expressed as follows: 
 
, , , ,
= 0 = 0
= (1 ) ( )
k
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It therefore follows that: 
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k
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t Ht Ft
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Using the fact that under Calvo price setting 
, , ,
=
1
H i t H t
r



 we have: 
 
, , 1 , 1 , ,
1
( ) = (1 ) ( )
1 1
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E E mcr b p p
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      

 
      
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 (64) 
The equation can then be expressed as (17). 
A.4.2 Imported price inflation 
In order to derive the Phillips Curve for inflation in the imported goods sector, it is necessary to 
solve the optimisation problem of Foreign firms setting the price of their goods in the Home 
market. When receiving a signal to update its price, a Foreign exporter chooses the price of its 
good in the Home market 
tiF
P
,,
 to maximise: 
  
, ,
, , , , , , , , ,
= 0
( ( ) ( )
F i tk
t t t k H i t k H i t i t k F i t k i t k
k t k
P
E Q C P M C C M C
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
    
    

 
   
 
   (65) 
subject to (8). 
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The first order condition with respect to 
tiF
P
,,
 is given by: 
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The equation can be rewritten as: 
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We will now define the relative optimal imported price 
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 After substitution, (67) can be expressed as: 
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Using the fact that 
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 and after log-linearizing (68) around a 
symmetric steady state we have: 
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The log deviation of the price elasticity of demand from its steady state is given by: 
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Therefore, after substitution, (69) can be expressed as follows: 
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Using the fact that under Calvo price setting 
, , ,
=
1
F i t F t
r



 we have: 
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The equation can then be expressed as (18). 
A.5 Approximation of a firm’s profit loss function 
Using Taylor series expansion, the quadratic approximation of firm i’s profits 
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, which corresponds to the price which would be optimal for firm i at time t + k if 
the firm were able to adjust its price costlessly in each period, is given by: 
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From the Envelope Theorem, the first-order term is equal to zero. Therefore, the difference in 
profits obtained at price 
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o
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P
P
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,
 prevailing at time t + k and profits obtained at the optimal flexible 
price in that period, 
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, is given by (22). 
A firm’s profit (in real terms) at time t + k is equal to: 
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The second derivative of the profit function with respect to 
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The first-order approximation of (76) around a symmetric steady state is given by: 
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Using (77), the difference in profits obtained at the optimal flexible price 
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f
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P
P

,
 and the price 
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, which prevails at time t + k, can be written as: 
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Therefore, up to the second order, the period loss function can be approximated as in (23). 
A.6 Structural parameters 
 
Table 1: Structural parameters 
Parameter Description Value 
σ Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption 
1.38 
ϕ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1.83 
β Discount factor 0.995 
α Probability of not receiving a signal to update 
prices in a given period 
0.75 
η1 Shape parameter of the demand function – baseline 
calibration 
-0.30 
η2 Shape parameter of the demand function – 
alternative calibration 
-0.28 
γ1 Shape parameter of the demand function – baseline 
calibration 
0.62 
γ2 Shape parameter of the demand function – 
alternative calibration 
0.67 
φπ Monetary policy rule – weight on inflation 
stabilisation 
1.5 
φy Monetary policy rule – weight on output 
stabilisation 
0.5 
ρa Persistence of productivity shocks 0.95 
σa Standard deviation of productivity shocks 0.45 
ρu Persistence of demand shocks 0.97 
σu Standard deviation of demand shocks 0.53 
ρv Persistence of monetary policy shocks 0.15 
σv Standard deviation of monetary policy shocks 0.24 
 
 
Figure 1: Price elasticity of demand and profits as functions of relative price 
Note: red line: 0.62=0.30,=   ; blue line : 0.67;=0.28,=    dotted line: CES demand 
function; solid line: non-CES demand function 
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Figure 2: Desired mark-up, price elasticity of demand and superelasticity of demand as 
functions of the number of varieties traded 
Note: red line: 0.62=0.30,=   ; blue line: 0.67=0.28,=    
 
Figure 3: Coefficients of the Phillips Curve as functions of the number of varieties traded 
Note: red line: 0.62=0.30,=   ; blue line: 0.67=0.28,=    
 
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a positive, one-standard-deviation productivity shock in the 
Home economy 
Note: red line: non-CES (with η = −0.30 and γ = 0.62 ); blue line: CES; dotted line: relatively 
closed economy 0.25)=( N ; solid line: relatively open economy 0.75)=( N  
 
Figure 5: Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the number of varieties 
traded 
Note: red line: 0.62=0.30,=   ; blue line: 0.67=0.28,=    
 
Figure 6: Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the mark-up 
Note: red line: 0.62=0.30,=   ; blue line: 0.67=0.28,=    
 
Figure 7: Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the mark-up and the 
number of varieties traded for different parametrisations of the shock processes 
Note: solid line: 0.24;=0.53;=0.45;=
1,1,1, vua
  dotted line: ;0.8=;0.8=
1,2,1,2, uuaa
  
vv 1,2,
0.8=  ; the demand function parameters are: 0.62=0.30,=    
 
Figure 8: Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the mark-up and the 
number of varieties traded for different parametrisations of the monetary policy rule 
Note: solid line: 

  = 1.5; dotted line: 

  = 2.0; the demand function parameters are: η = −0.30, 
 γ = 0.62 
 
Figure 9: Coefficients of the Phillips Curve as functions of the number of varieties traded 
in the case of endogenous frequency of price adjustment 
Note: red line: 0.62=0.30,=   ; blue line: 0.67=0.28,=    
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